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Casenotes
Clemons v. Mississippi--Shortcut to the
Executioner?
Statutes authorizing capital punishment exist in 37 states
today,1 although the statutes vary among jurisdictions.' These
statutes have often been challenged for vagueness.' Challenges to
such statutes are based upon claims that the statutes lead to
arbitrary or capricious death sentences, and thus constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, which is prohibited by the eighth
amendment.4 In addition, there have been several challenges on
capital appeals of the methods by which appellate courts may
1. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1733 n.1 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT op JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988, p. 5 (July 1989)). The states authorizing capital punishment are:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, Wyoming. Id.
2. See, e.g., id. (illustrating the variations in mandatory appellate review and the waiveability
of death sentences among jurisdictions). Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1985) and
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(c)(3) (Supp. 1990) (requiring the trier of fact to find the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances before imposing death sentence) with GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-31 (1990) (permitting trier of fact to impose death penalty if there are any aggravating
circumstances present, without weighing such circumstances against mitigating factors).
3. See infra notes 24-32 and 38-56 and accompanying text (summarizing cases based upon
void for vagueness challenges).
4. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating arbitrary death
sentences that were based upon vague statutes); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (affirming
a death sentence against challenge of arbitrariness and capriciousness); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976) (affirming a death sentence against challenge of arbitrariness and capriciousness); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (affirming a death sentence against challenge of arbitrariness and
capriciousness). See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing Furman). The due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments guarantee individuals that no deprivation of life,
liberty, or property will occur "'without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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uphold death sentences founded upon constitutionally defective
statutes.
5
Clemons v. Mississippi' afforded the Supreme Court of the
United States an opportunity to review both vagueness and
appellate review technique challenges to a state death penalty
statute.7 The case focused upon a capital punishment statute which
contained an aggravating circumstance that had been declared
unconstitutionally vague under the eighth amendment by the
Supreme Court:8 Further, the case raised the issue of how much
discretion an appellate court may exercise in upholding a death
sentence which had been based, in part, upon an unconstitutional
aggravating circumstance.9 In Clemons, the Court held that when
a jury imposes a death sentence after weighing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances against each other, and one of the
aggravating circumstances is later deemed unconstitutionally vague
under the eighth amendment, the defendant's due process rights are
not compromised if an appellate court upholds the sentence by
either reweighing the remaining circumstances or employing
harmless error analysis"0 to the judgment."
Part I of this Note will discuss the legal background of death
sentence challenges based upon unconstitutionally vague statutes
and the method of appellate review. 2 Part II discusses the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Clemons.3 Part
III assesses the constitutional significance of Clemons with respect
5. See infra notes 40-47, 48-55, 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), and Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 (1983)).
6. 110 S. CL 1441 (1990).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1444-45.
9. Id. at 1446-49.
10. An error is "harmless" if it is trivial, formal, or merely academic, is not prejudicial to a
party's substantial rights, and does not affect the outcome of the case. State v. Johnson, 1 Wash. App.
553, 463 P.2d 205, 206 (1969). See infra notes 129-135 and accompanying text (discussing the
harmless error rule announced in Clemons v. Mississippi).
11. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1449-51.
12. See infra notes 17-78 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 79-156 and accompanying text.
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to the eighth amendment.'4 Part IV discusses the Clemons
decision with respect to the relevant California capital sentencing
laws. 5 Finally, Part V presents the potential legal ramifications of
Clemons.6
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Death sentence challenges are often based upon the failure of
an imposed sentence to satisfy one of two primary constitutional
requirements. The most common challenge asserts that the relevant
capital punishment statute is unconstitutionally vague under the
eighth amendment. 7 The other type of challenge questions the
amount of discretion an appellate court may exercise in upholding
a death sentence which has been based upon a constitutionally-
defective statute."8
A. "Void for Vagueness" Challenges and the Furman Rule
A common constitutional challenge asserted by capital
punishment defendants is that the applicable death penalty statute
is impermissibly vague,1 9  and thus violates the eighth
14. See infra notes 157-164 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 165-193 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 194-212 and accompanying text. The death penalty's validity and purpose
in society has been debated since this country's inception. See D. HOOK & L KAHN, DEATH IN THE
BALANCE-THE DEBATE OF CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 21-28 (1989) (summarizing the historical
developments of capital punishment in the United States). The controversy continues to this day. See
generally R. Tabak & J.M. Lane, The Execution of Injustice-A Cost and Lack of Benefits Analysis
of the Death Penalty, 23 LoY. LA.L REV. 59 (1989) (asserting the death penalty's failure as an
efficient means of punishment). However, a debate on the merits of the death penalty is beyond the
scope of this Note. Instead, this Note focuses upon several constitutional aspects of appellate review
of death sentences with respect to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Clemons v.
Mississippi. For a sampling of the arguments for and against capital punishment, see E. VAN DEN
HAAo & J.P. CONRAD, The DEATH PENALTY-A DEBATE (1983) and HOOK & KAHN, supra.
17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing cases illustrating void for vagueness
challenges).
18. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (citing cases illustrating challenges based upon
improper appellate court discretion).
19. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (overturning a death sentence because
of an unconstitutionally vague sentencing statute).
937
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amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.2"
A statute violates the eighth amendment when the sentencing
parameters provide a jury with insufficient detail about the
circumstances of the crime which must exist to justify imposition
of the death penalty.2" Such vagueness leaves jurors and appellate
courts with constitutionally impermissible open-ended discretion.22
As a result, the death sentences rendered under these statutes are
normally reversed or vacated on appeal by the Supreme Court of
the United States.
23
The most significant case to arise from a void for vagueness
challenge is Furman v. Georgia.24 In Furman, the Supreme Court
held that a state may not impose the death penalty under sentencing
procedures that create a substantial risk of punishment in an
"arbitrary or capricious manner. '" 5 To illustrate, one of the
statutes under scrutiny in Furman authorized a jury to choose one
of three punishments for murder: the death penalty, life
imprisonment, or imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary for
between one and twenty years.26 The statute provided no
guidelines for the jury to use in determining when each type of
sentence would be appropriate.27 Deciding in favor of one over
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See also supra notes 24-32, 40-47, 48-55 and
accompanying text (describing cases which arose from void for vagueness challenges).
21. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,427-28 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.).
22. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 253-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., id, 408 U.S. 238; Godfrey, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). But cf. Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356 (1988) (striking down a death sentence based upon an unconstitutionally worded statute,
but allowing for the possibility of affirmance if the statute were construed narrowly); infra notes 48-
55 and accompanying text (summarizing Maynard).
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
25. Id. at 309-310 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Furman Court issued five opinions in support
of the judgment's reversal and four dissenting opinions. Because Furman was combined with two
other cases, three separate defendants were involved, each of whom was sentenced to death under
a statute which was challenged as violative of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment because of the vagueness of the statute. Id. at 239-40. Specifically, one
defendant, Furman, was sentenced to death for murder under Georgia law, another was sentenced to
death for rape under Georgia law, and the third was sentenced to death for rape under Texas law. Id.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (applicable murder statute); id. § 26-1302 (applicable
rape statute); TEXAS PENAL CODE § 1189 (Vernon 1961) (applicable Texas rape statute).
26. Furman, 408 U.S. at 308, n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring) (summarizing Georgia Code section
26-1302).
27. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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the other two punishments was purely a matter of juror
discretion.2" The Court held that, since the statutes in Furman
provided insufficient guidance for a trier of fact to determine the
appropriateness of the death penalty, the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague.29
The Furman void for vagueness rule rests on the belief that
there must be an identifiable means by which to distinguish those
who receive the death penalty from those who do not.3" Without
statutory guidelines, jurors are left to themselves to decide which
factors merit the death penalty over other punishments, thus
28. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
29. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice Douglas stated in condemning the statutes for their
lack of guidance: "'People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12... Thus, these
discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation." Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 309-310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Of the five separate concurring opinions in
Furman, two viewed the death penalty as per se cruel and unusual punishment and therefore violative
of the eighth amendment in all instances. See id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370
(Marshall, J., concurring). The other three concurring opinions viewed the death penalty, as imposed
under the statutes at issue, as unconstitutional under the eighth amendment, thereby implying the
possibility that other less discriminatory statutes would be constitutional. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring). The four
dissenting justices proclaimed the death penalty statutes at issue to be constitutional. Id. at 375
(Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id.
at 470 (Remquist, L, dissenting). Because of these diverse views, Furman left open the question of
whether the death penalty is unconstitutional in all instances. As Chief Justice Burger stated in his
dissent:
Since there is no majority of the Court on the ultimate issue presented in these cases,
the future of capital punishment in this country has been left in an uncertain limbo.
Rather than providing a final and unambiguous answer on the basic constitutional
question, the collective impact of the majority's ruling is to demand an undetermined
measure of change from the various state legislatures and the Congress.
Id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Four years later, the Court handed down three landmark
decisions in one day, when it affirmed the death sentences in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). In upholding three
separate state statutes, the Court declared that each statute satisfied the eighth amendment because
each statute more clearly defined the parameters for imposing a death sentence and thus eliminated
the arbitrariness and capriciousness found in Furman. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-207 (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268-276 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The Gregg-
Proffitt-Jurek trilogy put to rest the issue of the death penalty's per se unconstitutionality and became
the benchmark for future scrutinization of state statutes on constitutional grounds. See infira notes 40-
47, 48-55, 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing cases based upon the Gregg-Proffirt-Jurek
standard). However, a statute which provides a mandatory death sentence for a particular crime is
unconstitutional. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 296-305 (1976).
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increasing the possibility that an improper factor such as race might
become the determining characteristic." Since Furman, several
Supreme Court cases have reinforced the rule that the channeling
and limiting of a sentencer's discretion in imposing the death
penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement.32
B. Specific Applications of the "Void for Vagueness" Rule in the
Context of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
Because of death sentence challenges based upon a statute's
insufficient guidance, the Supreme Court has occasionally reviewed
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances?' considered by the
trier of fact in determining whether to impose the death penalty?4
Statutes containing aggravating and mitigating circumstances must
describe to a jury, in precise terms, what conditions must exist for
the crime to merit the death penalty."5 If an aggravating
circumstance as defined by the statute is found to be
unconstitutionally vague, the issue arises as to whether a "limiting
construction" will cure this defect.
A limiting construction is a narrow and focused interpretation
of an aggravating circumstance which, without such construction,
could reasonably be interpreted in more than one manner. 6 In
order to ensure fairness under the eighth amendment, a court must
give meaning to, and almost define the relevant terms in order to
dispel any possible preconceptions jurors may harbor as to the
31. Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
32. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189, 206-07 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
ia& at 220-22 (White, J., concurring); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984); Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46 (1988).
33. Aggravating circumstances are those factors involved in the commission of a crime which
tend to increase or amplify the crime's gravity or injurious consequences. See BLACK's LAW
DIcTIoNARY 60 (definition of aggravation) (5th ed. 1979). Mitigating circumstances tend to reduce
the degree of "'moral culpability." See id. at 903 (definition of mitigating circumstances). However,
neither type of circumstance is an element of the crime itself. Id. at 60, 903.
34. See, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE §§ 190.2 (Deering Supp. 1991); 190.3 (Deering 1985); Miss.
CODE ANN § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1990) (statutes describing usage of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in sentencing).
35. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1988).
36. See id. at 362-63.
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meaning of the terms.37 Thus, a limiting construction by the court
leads to a limiting jury instruction. Two significant cases
illustrating this issue are Godfrey v. Georgia' and Maynard v.
Cartwright.9
In Godfrey v. Georgia, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that when a jury considers an aggravating circumstance that
is susceptible to several meanings, the jury must receive specific
instructions on the construction and application of the statute to the
facts.' In Godfrey, the defendant was sentenced to death under a
statute which allowed a death sentence to be imposed if the trier of
fact found the crime to have been "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible, or inhuman. ' 41  The Georgia Supreme Court had
previously determined that this statutory wording warranted a
limiting construction before being presented to the jury via a
limiting instruction.42 For example, in two prior cases, the court
assisted the jury in determining the statute's meaning by describing
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman" to involve
some degree of torture or aggravated battery inflicted upon the
victim, or mental depravity regarding the offender.43 However,
such a limiting construction was never utilized in Godfrey.' In
affirming the death sentence, the Georgia Supreme Court simply
held that the statute's language was "not objectionable," and that
37. Id.
38. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing Godfrey).
39. 486 U.S. 356 (1988). See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing Maynard).
40. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29 (opinion of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
41. Id. at 422 (opinion of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978).
42. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 429 (opinion of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
43. Id. at 430-31 (opinion of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (citing Harris v.
State, 237 Ga. 718, 732-33,230 S.E. 2d 1, 10-11 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) and Blake
v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 299, 236 S.E. 2d 637, 643 (1977)). In applying a limiting construction, the
Georgia Supreme Court had relied upon the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Gregg,
in which the Court held the same Georgia statute as not unconstitutional "'on its face." Id. at 427
(opinion of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
44. Id. at 429 (opinion of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In mandating a
limiting construction of the statute in previous cases, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized that
"'there is a possibility of abuse of [an applicable statute's] aggravating circumstance." Harris v. State,
237 Ga. 718, 732, 230 S.E. 2d 1, 10 (1976). The Georgia Supreme Court refused to permit the
statute's language to become a "'catchall" for crimes not conforming to any of the other statutory
circumstances. Id.
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the evidence supported the finding of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance.' On certiorari, the Supreme Court of
the United States reversed, finding that the Georgia Supreme
Court's affirmance of the death sentence was insufficient to cure
the jury's unchanneled discretion.46 The plurality stated that since
an ordinary person could reasonably conclude that virtually any
murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and
inhuman," the statute's wording, by itself, did not sufficiently
ensure that the statute was not applied in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.
47
In Maynard v. Cartwright, the Supreme Court of the United
States applied the Godfrey rule by holding that a limiting statutory
construction, provided in a limiting jury instruction, must be
employed if a statute's aggravating circumstance merely describes
the offense as "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' If
applied without such a construction, the statute is unconstitutionally
vague under the eighth amendment.49
The jury in Maynard imposed the death penalty after finding
that two aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating
circumstances.5" One aggravating circumstance allowed the jury
to impose the death penalty if the jury found the crime to have
been "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."5 " On certiorari, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the wording of the
Oklahoma statute provided no more guidance to the jury than did
the "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman"
45. Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 308-09, 253 S.E. 2d 710, 717 (1979) cert granted, 444
U.S. 897 (1979), reversed in part, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
46. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 429,433 (opinion of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
47. Id. at 428-29 (opinion of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The Court further
emphasized the recurring theme of "necessary fundamental fairness and impartiality" in death
sentence imposition when it criticized the Georgia Supreme Court's aflrumance of the sentence,
because, under the Georgia court's ruling, there was "no principled way to distinguish this case, in
which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." Id. at 433 (opinion
of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
43. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362-64 (1988). See OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, §
701.12(2), (4) (1981) (statute at issue in Maynard).
49. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362-63.
50. Id. at 358-59.
51. Id.
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language the Court previously deemed unconstitutional in
Godfrey.52 Moreover, the Court found that the state appellate
court's vague construction of the statute was identical to the
construction employed by the Georgia court in Godfrey, which had
failed to cure the jury's unfettered discretion and thereby satisfy the
eighth amendment.53 The Court felt that since a reasonable person
could conclude that nearly every murder is "especially heinous,"
the inherently unconstitutional wording of the statute could be
cured only through a limiting construction, which the Oklahoma
appellate court failed to employ.54 However, the Court refused to
prescribe the exact construction necessary, leaving that for the state
courts to interpret.55
Thus, under the Godfrey and Maynard limiting construction
rule, it is clear that a death sentence based upon an
unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance may be salvaged
if the sentencing jury is given an appropriate limiting
construction.56 This limitation ensures that the Furman void for
vagueness prohibition, and thus the eighth amendment, is satisfied.
C. May an Appellate Court Affirm a Death Sentence Which Was
Based Upon an Invalid Aggravating Circumstance?
A complex issue arises when an appellate court invalidates an
aggravating circumstance notwithstanding any limiting
construction.57  When a court invalidates an aggravating
circumstance, the appropriate limits of judicial review are at issue,
because the court must attempt to determine the effect the invalid
aggravating circumstance actually had upon the jury's deliberation
and the sentence rendered. The court must then decide whether to
uphold, vacate, or reverse the sentence. To understand this issue of
52. Id. at 363-64.
53. Id. at 364.
54. Id. at 364-65.
55. Id.
56. See supra notes 40-47,48-55 and accompanying text (discussing Godfrey and Maynard).
57. See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983) and the rule for salvaging a constitutionally-defective death sentence in nonweighing
jurisdictions).
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appellate review limitations, it is first essential to distinguish
between "weighing" and "nonweighing" capital punishment
jurisdictions.
To impose the death sentence in a weighing jurisdiction, the
trier of fact must determine, based upon the evidence presented,
whether any aggravating circumstances found outweigh any
mitigating circumstances present.5" If aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances, then the death penalty may be
imposed.59 Conversely, nonweighing jurisdictions do not require
aggravating circumstances to be balanced against mitigating
circumstances.' Instead, the trier of fact may impose death based
upon the mere existence of a specified number of aggravating
circumstances, regardless of whether any mitigating circumstances
are found.61
In Zant v. Stephens,62 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that in nonweighing jurisdictions, an appellate court's
invalidation of one aggravating circumstance contributing to a jury-
imposed death sentence does not require vacation of the sentence
by the appellate court.63 In Zant, the defendant was convicted of
murder in a Georgia state court, and a sentencing jury imposed the
death penalty after finding that three aggravating circumstances as
defined by the state statute existed.(' The Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed the sentence, despite having set aside one of the
58. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2)(c)
(Supp. 1990) (describing the procedure for weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances). The
California Supreme Court has ruled that the weighing process "is not a mere mechanical counting
of factors on each side of an imaginary scale but rather a mental balancing process." People v.
Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212, 253, 758 P.2d 25, 48, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 106 (1988).
59. Compare CAL PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1985) (requiring jury to impose the death
sentence if aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances) with Miss. CODE kN. §
99-19-101(2)(c)-(d) (Supp. 1990) (permining death sentence if aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances).
60. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 17-10-31 (1990) (pemitting trier of fact to impose death penalty
if there are any aggravating circumstances present, without weighing aggravating factors against
mitigating factors).
61. Id.
62. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
63. Id. at 890.
64. Id. at 864-66.
944
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aggravating circumstances defined by the statute.6 The court
determined that the sentence was not impaired by the invalidated
circumstance, because the remaining circumstances, by themselves,
were sufficient to justify the death penalty." The Supreme Court
of the United States agreed, holding that the invalidation of one
aggravating circumstance did not necessarily render the death
sentence void.67 The Court reasoned that the jury clearly had not
relied exclusively upon this invalid circumstance.6" In reaching
this conclusion, the Court distinguished the Zant verdict from a
general guilty verdict, which must be set aside if the jury was
instructed that it could rely upon any of two or more independent
grounds of guilt, one of which is later ruled invalid.69 Such a
sentence must be vacated, because when a jury relies upon any of
two or more aggravating circumstances in reaching a general
verdict, it is unclear whether the jury relied exclusively upon the
invalid circumstance.7" Conversely, the jury in Zant did not return
a general verdict. 1 Instead, the jury based its decision upon two
distinct aggravating circumstances, thereby providing the basis for
upholding the sentence when one circumstance was determined to
be unconstitutional.72 The remaining circumstance did not render
the sentence arbitrary of capricious, and was thus sufficient.73
Therefore, the Court upheld the sentence.74 The Court, however,
specifically limited the Zant salvage rule to nonweighing
jurisdictions.75 The Court reserved judgment on the significance
of an invalid aggravating circumstance in weighing jurisdictions.76
65. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 261-62, 227 S.E. 2d 261, 263 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 986 (1977), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1067 (1977).
66. Id.
67. Zant, 462 U.S. at 891.
68. Id. at 888-91.
69. Id. at 881. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-70 (1931).
70. See Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 367-70.
71. Zant, 462 U.S. at 866-67.
72. Id. at 866-68.
73. Id. at 868, 889-90.
74. Id. at 889-91.
75. Id. at 890-91.
76. Id.
945
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Thus, there are several ways a constitutionally defective death
sentence may be affirmed. Under Godfrey and Maynard, a state
appellate court may affirm a death sentence despite a vaguely-
worded aggravating circumstance when the circumstance is given
a limiting construction.' Under Zant, a state appellate court in a
nonweighing jurisdiction may uphold a death sentence despite an
unconstitutional aggravating circumstance, so long as the
invalidation of the circumstance does not make the sentence
arbitrary or capricious.78 However, the issue of what a state
appellate court may do in a weighing jurisdiction has remained
open until the Court's recent decision in Clemons v. Mississippi.
II. THE CASE
In Clemons v. Mississippi,9 defendant Chandler Clemons
appealed the imposition of a death sentence for his murder
conviction. Specifically, Clemons claimed that the state courts'
imposition and affirmance of the death penalty violated his rights
under the eighth amendment's requirement to properly channel the
jury's discretion, and under the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause.8"
A. The Facts
On the evening of April 17, 1987, Clemons told his friends,
Anthony Calvin and Antonio Hay, that he needed money, and
suggested that they rob a pizza delivery man.81 The men called a
local pizza establishment and ordered a pizza for delivery at a
nearby apartment complex.82 During the delivery, Clemons and
Hay used a sawed-off shotgun to rob the employee, Arthur Shorter,
77. See supra notes 40-47,48-55 and accompanying text (discussing Godfrey and Maynard).
78. Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
79. 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990).
80. Id. at 1447-48.
81. Id. at 1444.
82. Id.
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of pizza and money."' On the way back to their vehicle, Hay
suggested to Clemons that he kill Shorter, due to the possibility of
later identification.' Clemons shot Shorter before driving away
with his friends, and Shorter died soon thereafter."'
Later that evening, Calvin related the events to his sister's
friend, a county jail employee. 6 The next day, the county sheriff
arrested Calvin and Clemons. 7 Clemons waived his right to
counsel, and then gave a statement to the sheriff naming Calvin as
the triggerman in the killing.8 Two days later, Calvin made a
statement proclaiming Clemons to have been the killer.8 9
Calvin, Clemons and Hay were indicted for capital murder,"
and the trial court severed the cases for separate trials.9" After a
change in venue, a jury convicted Clemons of capital murder.92 At
83. Id. at 1444-45.
84. Id. at 1445.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (No. 88-6873)
(1990) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
88. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 87, at 3. See Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1445.
89. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 87, at 3. See Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1445.
90. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 87, at 3. Mississippi state law distinguishes murder from
capital murder as follows: A homicide is classified as murder if the killing was either. (1)
Premeditated; (2) not premeditated, but performed while endangering others and "evincing a
depraved heart, regardless of human life... ;" or (3) performed during the actual or attempted
commission of a felony other than rape, kidnapping, burglary, arson, robbery, sexual battery,
unnatural intercourse with a child under 12 years of age, nonconsensual intercourse with mankind,
or felonious child abuse and/or battery. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (1) (Supp. 1990). Capital murder
is defined as any of the following: (1) The murder of a peace officer or fireman during the course
of duty with knowledge of the victim's identity; (2) a murder committed by an inmate already under
a life sentence; (3) a murder which employed the use of an explosive device; (4) a murder committed
while engaging in an unlawful act for personal economic gain; (5) a murder which occurs during the
actual or attempted commission of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery,
unnatural intercourse with a child under 12 years of age, nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with
mankind, or felonious child abuse or battery; or (6) the murder of an elected governmental official,
with prior knowledge of the victim's identity. Id. § 97-3-19(2).
91. Petitioner's Brief, supra, note 87, at 3. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1445
(1990).
92. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1445.
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trial, the principal witness against Clemons was Calvin, with whom
the state had arranged a plea agreement.93
1. The Mississippi Statute
The Mississippi statute in question in Clemons sets forth the
sentencing procedures for capital cases.9' The statute calls for a
bifurcated trial procedure, whereby separate trials are held for
determining guilt and punishment.95 Under this statute, a person
convicted of a capital offense is entitled to a separate sentencing
proceeding before a jury.96 Both the state and the defendant may
present arguments for or against imposition of the death sentence,
but under no circumstances may unconstitutionally obtained
evidence be admitted into the proceeding.'
Since Mississippi is a weighing jurisdiction, the jury must
weigh any aggravating and mitigating circumstances present to
determine the appropriateness of a death sentence." One
aggravating circumstance the jury may consider under the statute
is whether "the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel."" This is the same terminology found in the Maynard
statute, which the Court determined to be unconstitutionally vague
if not narrowly construed, and presented to the jury with a limiting
instruction."°
93. Id. Under the plea arrangement, Calvin agreed to testify when requested to do so by the
state, in return for which: (1) Calvin's testimony would not be used against him at his own trial for
capital murder, and (2) the state would not seek the death penalty against him at his trial. Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 87, at 4.
94. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1445-46. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1990).
95. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1990).
96. Id. § 99-19-101(1).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 99-19-101(2). For the jury to impose death, it must unanimously find that there are
insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances found. Id. § 99-19-
101(3).
99. Id. § 99-19-101(5)(h).
100. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-66 (1988).
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2. The Sentence
After delivering a guilty verdict against Clemons, the jury
heard evidence concerning aggravation and mitigation of the
sentence.' After deliberation, the jury found the existence of
two aggravating circumstances: (1) That the capital offense was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of
robbery and was committed for pecuniary gain; and (2) that the
capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."° The
jury further found that there were insufficient mitigating
circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, and
sentenced Clemons to death. 03
101. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1445. See Petitioners Brief supra, note 87, at 4-5. During the
sentencing proceeding, the jury heard evidence in support of nine separate mitigating factors, ranging
from Clemons' lack of a prior criminal record to his impaired judgment attributable to organic brain
damage. Petitioner's Brief, supra, note 87, at 4-5. However, it is unclear which of these mitigating
circumstances, if any, the jury found to exist, since to impose the death penalty the jury need not
explicitly state whether it found any mitigating circumstances to have existed. See Miss. CoDE ANN.
§ 99-19-101(3) (Supp. 1990). Rather, the jury must state only that there were insufficient mitigating
circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances found. Id.
102. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1445.
103. Id. The jury never explicitly found Clemons to have been the killer, the jury's written
findings were only: (1) That Clemons contemplated that lethal force would be employed; (2) that the
capital offense was committed while Clemons was engaged in the commission of robbery and was
committed for pecuniary gain; and (3) that the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. Defendant's Reply Brief on Remand from the United States Supreme Court 10-11 (No. 03-DP-
83) (Jury's Sentencing Instructions and Findings). These findings are marginally sufficient to impose
the death penalty in light of Enmund v. Florida, and Tison v. Arizona. Enmund held that a finding
that the defendant either actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing occur is sufficient
to justify a death sentence. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982). Tson extended this
doctrine to allow the death penalty if the defendant was a major participant in a felony, acting with
.'reckless indifference to human life.'" Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). In Bullock v.
State, a case similar to Clemons, the Mississippi Supreme Court reduced a sentence from death to
life imprisonment, despite the existence of two aggravating circumstances. Bullock v. State, 525
So.2d 764, 770 (Miss. 1987). The only Enmund factor satisfied in Bullock was that, as in Clemons,
the "defendant contemplated that lethal force would be used." Id. The court justified reversing the
death sentence because, at the time of the Bullock decision, "no capital defendant has had a death
sentence affirmed in [Mississippi] where the sole finding was that he contemplated lethal force." Id.
Clemons was a departure from that ruling because the contemplation of lethal force was the sole
finding used in affirming the death sentence.
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3. The Mississippi Supreme Court Appeal
Clemons appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court.1°4
Wile the appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court
held in Maynard v. Cartwright that Oklahoma's "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance was
unconstitutionally vague."05 Due to the identical language in the
Mississippi capital sentencing statute, the Mississippi Supreme
Court requested supplemental briefs on the effect the Maynard
decision should have on Clemons' case.' °6 The Mississippi
Supreme Court then overruled all assignments of error and affirmed
the death sentence, stating that Maynard was not controlling, for
several reasons.0 7 After the defendant's petition for a rehearing
was denied, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to determine the effect an invalid aggravating
circumstance might have on a jury-imposed death sentence
rendered in a weighing jurisdiction."°8
B. The Majority Opinion
In Clemons, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
in a weighing jurisdiction, when a jury-imposed death sentence is
based in part upon an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance, a
state appellate court may reweigh the remaining circumstances or
104. Clemons v. State, 535 So. 2d 1354 (Miss. 1988), cert granted in part, 109 S. Ct. 3184
(1989). See Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1441. In Mississippi capital cases, the convicted defendant may
not waive the right to at least one appellate review. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105 (Supp. 1990)
(requiring the Mississippi Supreme Court to perform a nonwaiveable review of the sentence in every
capital case).
105. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 87, at 6. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64
(1988).
106. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 87, at 6-7.
107. Clemons v. State, 535 So. 2d 1354, 1365 (Miss. 1988), cert. granted in part, 109 S. Ct.
3194 (1989). The Mississippi Supreme Court distinguished Clemons from Maynard on three grounds:
(1) Mississippi courts had previously upheld death sentences when an aggravating circumstance was
invalidated, because of the existence of other valid remaining circumstances; (2) the Mississippi
Supreme Court had previously given the aggravating circumstance at issue a limiting construction;
and (3) the trial court had repeatedly instructed the jury that it was not required to impose the death
penalty, even in the absence of mitigating circumstances. Id. at 1361-65.
108. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1446.
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apply harmless error analysis to uphold the sentence."° Justice
White wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.110
In reaching its decision, the Court stated that Maynard v.
Cartwright did not mandate reversal.111 Under Maynard, appellate
courts are not required to reverse a death sentence solely upon the
basis of unconstitutionally vague wording of a statute, so long as
the trial court employs a limiting construction.1 1 2 Although no
limiting construction was used in Clemons, the Court only vacated
rather than reversed the death sentence, because of the possibility
a limited jury instruction might cure the statute's defective
language.
113
Justice White then distinguished Zant v. Stephens from
Clemons, emphasizing that the Zant salvage rule applies only to
nonweighing jurisdictions, while Mississippi is a weighing
jurisdiction." 4 Thus, an "automatic" death sentence affirmance" 5
based upon the existence of the remaining aggravating
circumstance would have been improper. 6 However, the Court
prescribed two other grounds for upholding the sentence: appellate
reweighing and harmless error analysis."'
The Court announced a new standard of judicial review, by
permitting appellate courts to reweigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances."' Under this new standard, an appellate court may
affirm a death sentence which was based in part upon an invalid
109. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1446-48.
110. Id. at 1444-52.
111. Id. at 1445-46.
112. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing Maynard's invalidation of an
aggravating circumstance).
113. Ckemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1445-46.
114. Id. at 1446. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2)(c) (Supp. 1990) (describing the
procedure for weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances). See also supra notes 62-76 and
accompanying text (discussing Zant).
115. The Court emphasized the necessity for an appellate court to reweigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances because an "automatic rule of affirmance... would not give defendants
the individualized treatment that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating factors
and aggravating circumstances." Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1450.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1446-52.
118. Id. at 1445-49.
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aggravating circumstance, by removing that circumstance from
consideration and reweighing all remaining factors. 19
1. Appellate Reweighing Does Not Violate the Eighth
Amendment
Clemons asserted that appellate reweighing violates the eighth
amendment because appellate courts are unable to fully consider
and evaluate mitigating factors. 2 ' In rejecting this argument, the
Court stressed that the main objective of scrutinizing death
sentences under an eighth amendment analysis is to ensure that the
sentencing decision is based upon the particular facts and
circumstances of the case,"2 and that an appellate court is well-
suited for this task." Justice White also emphasized the twin
objectives of "measured consistent application" and "fairness to
the accused" in reviewing death sentences with respect to the
eighth amendment."z The majority stated that these objectives
are not compromised when an appellate court reweighs aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, citing the long-standing proposition
that meaningful appellate review promotes reliability and
consistency.24 Since appellate courts regularly review death
sentences under strict eighth amendment guidelines, the majority
was satisfied that state appellate courts can, and do, give maximum
deference to each defendant's circumstances.1 25 Clemons also
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1448. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 87, at 33-40. On certiorari, Clemons asserted
that the Mississippi Supreme Courts refusal to remand the cause to a jury for reconsideration
violated its own prior adherence to the principle that a jury alone finds facts, assesses credibility and
determines the sentence in capital proceedings. Id. at 36. In fact, the Mississippi Supreme Court
stated in Clemons v. State that it was beyond the court's province to decide these issues. Clemons
v. State, 535 So. 2d 1354, 1359 (Miss. 1988), cert. granted in part, 109 S. Ct. 3184 (1989). The
Mississippi Supreme Court stated: * The credibility of a witness is not for the reviewing court...
It was the function of the jury to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and to resolve the issues."
Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 196, 207 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986),
reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1189 (1986)).
121. Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (1990).
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raised several due process challenges to reweighing, based upon the
sixth126 and fourteenth amendments, 127 but the Court rejected
126. Clemons raised an important sixth amendment corollary issue regarding appellate
reweighing - whether an appellate court is competent to redetermine matters of credibility. Id. at
1446-47. He claimed appellate reweighing violates the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to a
jury trial, because factual determinations must now be made by the court rather than a jury. Id. See
U.S. CONST. amend VI. However, the Supreme Court adhered to a narrow view of the term "trial,"
as elucidated in several prior decisions, and reasoned that the guarantee does not extend to
sentencing. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1446-47. See, e.g., Hildwin v. Florida, 109 S. CL 2055 (1989),
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (cases
narrowly construing the sixth amendment right to jury trial). The Court also used the language of the
sixth amendment itself in reasoning that nothing in the sixth amendment grants the jury the sole
power to impose a sentence of death, or to make the requisite findings for the imposition of such a
sentence. Clemons, 110 S. C. at 1446. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385 (1986) (holding
that capital sentencing is not necessarily a jury function); Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984)
(finding no constitutional requirement for jury sentencing in capital cases). Extending this strict
interpretation of the sixth amendment even further, the Court augmented the reweighing power of
appellate courts by determining that the sixth amendment does not require the jury to be the only
body to specify the aggravating factors justifying a death sentence, or to sentence the defendant, even
where specific findings of fact are required. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1446. Additionally, the Court
found no double jeopardy basis for prohibiting a judge to override a jury's recommended sentence,
since the double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple trials for the same offense, rather than judicial
discretion in sentencing. Id. at 1447. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting any person "subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"); id. amend. XIV, § I (extending federal
due process guarantees to state proceedings). Some states have further enforced this principle by
statute. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 687 (West 1985) (prohibiting a second prosecution for a public
offense for which one has already been prosecuted and convicted or acquitted).
127. Clemons, 110 S.Ct at 1447. Clemons also asserted that under Mississippi law, only a jury
could validly impose a death sentence, and that this requirement provides the defendant with a
fourteenth amendment liberty interest in having a jury make all findings relevant to the sentence. Id.
at 1447. Clemons asserted this right could not be denied without due process. Id. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1990) (describing sentencing proceeding in capital cases). The basis of the
defendant's claim rested in the statute's wording that "[Tihe (sentencing) proceeding shall be
conduqted by the trial judge before the trialjury as soon as pacticable... If the trial jury has been
waived, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before ajury
impaneled for that purpose." See MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
Clemons based this argument, in part, upon Gardner v. Florida, in which the Court reaffirmed the
recurring constitutional theme of fairness and impartiality when it stated that "it is of vital
importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence
be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1447.
See Gardner, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (opinion of Stevens, Stewart, and Powell, JJ.). Clemons also
cited the Court's decision in Hicks v. Oklahoma, which prohibits an appellate court from making
speculative fimdings in lieu of a jury's particular findings, if particular findings are required under
state law. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1447. In Hicks, the defendant had been sentenced by a jury under
an Oklahoma recidivist statute which required a 40-year term. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343,
344-45 (1980). In another case, the state appellate court had held the applicable provision of the
statute to be unconstitutional. Id. at 345. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to remand
Hicks' sentence for a new hearing, reasoning that Hicks "was not prejudiced by the impact of the
invalid statute, because his sentence was within the range of punishment that could have been
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each of them, citing numerous cases and a strict interpretation of
the Constitution."
imposed in any event." Id. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, stating:
Where, however, a State has provided for the imposition of criminal punishment in the
discretion of the trial jury, it is not correct to say that the defendant's interest in the
exercise of that discretion is merely a matter of state procedural law. The defendant in
such a case has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his
liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory
discretion, and that liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves
against arbitrary deprivation by the State.
Id. at 346 (citations omitted). The Court then described the due process violation by stating:
In this case Oklahoma denied the petitioner the jury sentence to which he was entitled
under state law, simply on the frail conjecture that a jury might have imposed a sentence
equally as harsh as that mandated by the invalid habitual offender provision. Such an
arbitrary disregard of the petitioner's right to liberty is a denial of due process of law.
Id. (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court distinguished between substantive due process claims
and procedural due process claims, such as Clemons', when it stated that, "Procedural due process
rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified
deprivation of life, liberty, or property." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). When a state
statute "creates" a life, liberty, or property interest, the statute itself may not also prescribe the
procedure for its termination. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980); Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985). Thus, when a court finds such a statutorily-
created interest to exist, the due process clause then applies, and the remaining question of "what
process is due" is determined on constitutional, not statutory principles. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541-
42 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). As Justice White stated for the
Loudermill Court: "An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."'
Id. at 542 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). The
Court in Clemons responded to petitioner's due process argument by construing the Mississippi
statute as not restricting the power to impose the death penalty to juries. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1447.
In reaching this decision, the Court stated that the principles of due process permit the Mississippi
Supreme Court to decide for itself whether the state statute permits the state court to affirm a death
sentence despite an invalid aggravating circumstance. Id. at 1447-48. Thus, no liberty interest was
infringed by reweighing the remaining circumstances, because it was the judiciary which determined
the procedure for limiting that right. Id. The Court's determination seems consistent with Vitek and
Loudermill, which prohibit a statute from prescribing the procedure for terminating a fundamental
right, in this case, Clemons' right to jury imposition of a death sentence. Here, the termination
procedure, affirming the sentence, was prescribed by the state supreme court, consistent with Vitek
and Loudermill, although the source of the authority was the Mississippi statute. Id. Thus, so long
as the judicially-deternined procedure for terminating a capital defendant's life is "appropriate to the
nature of the case," as required by Mullane, and which the Court determined to be true here, the due
process clause is satisfied. Id.
128. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 144648.
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Z Harmless Error Analysis is Permissible
Finally, the Court held that, even if Mississippi law prohibited
an appellate court from reweighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, the state supreme court nevertheless was within its
authority to affirm the sentence on the basis of harmless error
analysis."' The Court relied upon the rationale employed by the
Barclay v. Florida13 plurality."' In Barclay, the Court asserted
that a state appellate court could apply harmless error
reasoning"' to a trial judge-imposed death sentence.133 The
Clemons Court extended this reasoning to conclude that harmless
error analysis is permissible when an appellate court concludes
beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury's verdict would have been
the same had the jury not considered the invalid circumstance.'3
However, the Court admitted that a finding of harmless error in
Clemons would be strained, given the facts of record.
135
In summary, the Supreme Court of the United States declared
that a state appellate court has the ability to uphold a death
sentence by either reweighing the remaining circumstances or
applying harmless error analysis. 36 However, the Court vacated
and remanded the case to the Mississippi Supreme Court for
sentencing, because that court's opinion did not indicate whether
it had in fact employed one of these two methods of judicial
review."
129. Id. at 1450.
130. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
131. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1450.
132. See supra note 10 (explanation of harmless error).
133. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 958 (opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, CJ., White, and
O'Connor, JJ.).
134. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1451. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was first
announced in Chapman v. California, wherein the Court upheld a death sentence after one of two
aggravating circumstances involved was declared invalid, since the Chapman Court felt that the jury's
verdict would have been the same without that factor. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967).
135. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1451. The dissent also agreed with this assertion. Id. at 1459
(Blaclanun, J., concurring and dissenting).
136. See supra notes 109-135 and accompanying text (discussing Clemons).
137. Clemons, 110 S. CLt. at 1451-52.
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C. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's judgment that the
sentence should be vacated, but dissented from the methodology
employed by the majority in reaching that result.' Justice
Brennan has previously asserted that the death penalty is in all
instances cruel and unusual punishment and thus, prohibited by the
eighth amendment.139 Therefore, Justice Brennan dissented from
the portion of the majority's opinion which permits appellate courts
to uphold death sentences by "reweighing" aggravating and
mitigating circumstances."4
Justice Blackmun also wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment and dissenting from the majority's reweighing
theory. 1' Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in this
opinion, criticizing the majority's reasoning on several
grounds.'42  First, Justice Blackmun's dissent asserted that
Maynard v. Cartwright mandated reversal of Clemons' sentence,
because Maynard permits constitutionally-infirm death statutes to
be employed only if given an appropriate limited construction.'43
Prior to and including Clemons, the Mississippi courts were
reluctant to limit the construction of the "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance language.'
44
Furthermore, the Mississippi Supreme Court had consistently
deferred to trial judges' refusal to administer limiting
138. Id. at 1452 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
139. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, ., dissenting).
140. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1452 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). It is interesting to
note that Justice Marshall neither joined Justice Brennan's opinion, nor did he write a separate
opinion on similar grounds, since Justice Marshall has also consistently opposed the death penalty
under all circumstances on eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment grounds. See, e.g.,
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314-74 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 231
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1452-62 (Blacknun, J., concurring and dissenting).
142. Id. (Blackaun, L, concurring and dissenting).
143. Id. at 1452-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
144. Id. at 1453 (Blackanun, J., concurring and dissenting).
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instructions. 145 These errors, the dissenters argued, render the
statute and sentence void under Maynad. 
1 46
Second, Justice Blackmun stated that the majority's suggestion
that the Mississippi Supreme Court could salvage a death sentence
by reweighing the remaining circumstances amounted to a "pure
and simple advisory opinion," a type of opinion which the Court
has previously declined to issue.147 The Blackmun dissent
claimed that the Court's proper role is to await and then review the
decisions of other courts, not to offer to state courts an entirely
new and untested technique, such as reweighing. 148 The dissent
argued that this impropriety is heightened because reweighing
expedites capital appeals. 149 Consequently, Justice Blackmun felt
the Court overstepped its bounds by offering the prospective
reweighing guidance to lower courts.5 '
Finally, the dissent emphasized the traditional distinction
between the functions performed by trial and appellate courts, and
argued that an appellate court's ability to reweigh facts infringes
145. Id. at 1453-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
146. Id. at 1452-54 (Blacknun, J., concurring and dissenting). See supra notes 48-55 and
accompanying text (discussing Maynard).
147. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1455 (Blackmun, L, concurring and dissenting). See Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-45 (1983); Bayard v. Lombard, 50 U.S. 530, 548-49 (1850) (both cases
refusing to issue advisory opinions). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 12 (4th
ed. 1983). The rule against issuing advisory opinions is derived from an "implicit policy" embodied
in Article II of the Constitution, in which the Constitution's framers restricted the federal courts to
determination of "'cases and controversies" as normally construed by English courts. Id. See U.S.
CONST. art Ell. As Justice Frankfurter stated:
[A] court will not decide a question unless the nature of the action challenged, the kind
of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial
determination is consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the
Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The policy against issuing advisory opinions results from the risk that arises when the
court rules on abstract questions rather than limiting decisions to concrete cases in which genuine
adversaries have precisely framed and explored every aspect of each issue. See WRIGHT, supra, § 12;
U.S. v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961).
148. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1455 (Blackmun, J, concurring and dissenting).
149. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
150. Id. at 1455 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
I
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upon the domain of trial courts.15 1 In support of this view, Justice
Blackmun noted the Supreme Court's prior adherence to the view
that appellate courts must defer to trial court findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous."' The dissent characterized as "inexplicable"
the majority's willingness to allow factual issues in a capital case
to be decided by a standard of appellate review which the Court
had previously determined to be inadequate even for civil
litigation.
153
The dissent further criticized the principle of appellate
reweighing of capital sentences because of the intangibles present
in most capital sentencing proceedings, which cannot effectively be
conveyed through the written medium.15 1 Justice Blackmun noted
that one such intangible in this case was the mitigating factor of
Clemons' remorse. 55 Justice Blackmun stated that to suggest that
this factor could be given proper consideration through a written
transcript violates the eighth amendment requirement to review
each capital sentencing case with respect to the individual facts at
hand.
156
151. Id. at 1459 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
152. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
564, 575 (1985) (stating that the trial judge is in the best position to discern the truth or falsity of
testimony).
153. Cemons, 110 S. CL at 1459 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
154. Id. at 1460 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
155. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Other mitigating factors asserted by
Clemons included: (1) His youth (18 years of age); (2) his lack of any prior criminal record; (3) his
chance of benefitting from rehabilitation; (4) his status as a drug and alcohol abuser, (5) the fact that
he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time of the crime; (6) his organic brain
damage which impaired his judgment; and (7) his voluntary surrender to the sheriff. See Clemons v.
State, 535 So. 2d 1354, 1359-60 (Miss. 1988). See also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 87, at 35.
156. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at 1460 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Blackmun
expressed a strong need to consider each capital case "with that degree of respect due the uniqueness
of the individual." Id. (Blaclanun, J., concurring and dissenting).
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I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CLEMONS ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S LIMITATIONS
A. Clemons v. Mississippi Modifies the Zant v. Stephens Salvage
Rule for Use in Weighing Jurisdictions
In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court of the United States
enunciated the basic rule that a death sentence is inherently invalid
if founded upon an unconstitutionally vague statute that fails to
effectively limit and channel the trier of fact's discretion by
providing precise guidelines for imposing such a sentence.157
Later cases such as Godfrey and Maynard provide specific
examples of unconstitutionally vague statutes,"'8 and Maynard
illustrates how a trial court can use a limiting jury instruction to
overcome an overly vague statute.5 9
Further, Zant describes how an appellate court in a
nonweighing jurisdiction can save a death sentence where no
limiting jury instruction has been given, so long as there remains
at least the statutory minimum number of valid aggravating
circumstances." 6 Now, in Clemons, the Court has prescribed how
appellate courts in weighing jurisdictions may save a death
sentence which was based in part upon an unconstitutionally vague
aggravating circumstance. This can be done be either reweighing
the remaining circumstances or employing harmless error
analysis. 161
B. Clemons v. Mississippi Expands Appellate Review Powers
In Clemons, the Supreme Court once again affirmed the eighth
amendment's prohibition of arbitrary and capricious death
sentences, but the Court simultaneously expanded the power of
appellate review by permitting reweighing and harmless error
157. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing Furman).
158. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text (discussing Godfrey and Maynard).
159. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing Maynard).
160. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing ZanO.
161. See supra notes 109-135 and accompanying text (discussing Clemons).
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analysis. Consequently, there are at least two possible ways to
interpret this new power.
1. Will Appellate Review Authority over Death Sentences be
Abused?
First, Clemons arguably results in a convenient exception to
strict constitutional requirements, similar to a Maynard limiting
construction, which an appellate court may employ in
circumventing the eighth amendment's strict parameters. Critics
might say that some appellate courts, anxious to expedite capital
appeals, will use Clemons as a shortcut for indiscriminantly
affitrming death sentences, using the broad rubric of appellate
reweighing or harmless error as the basis for their decisions. After
all, the argument goes, one person's critical factual circumstance
might be another's harmless error," so there is little to prevent
judicial abuse of the Clemons rule. Naturally, the significance of
this argument is heightened by the fact that a person's right to live
is dependent upon the outcome of an appellate court's exercise in
second-guessing a jury's mental processes.
2. The Clemons Rule Does Not Circumvent Eighth Amendment
Requirements
However, in the author's opinion, the better view is that the
Court did not authorize constitutional shortcuts by authorizing
appellate reweighing. Instead, the Court in Clemons filled a void
which had existed since the Zant salvage rule, the holding of which
was inapplicable to weighing jurisdictions.163 Therefore, by
permitting appellate reweighing and harmless error analysis, the
162. Of course, only the jury knows with absolute certainty which facts or circumstances were
crucial to the verdict rendered. However, our judicial system does not require absolute certainty, and
herein may lie the weakness in this criticism of Clemons. For an appellate court to affirm a death
sentence on the basis of harmless error, the court must merely frind, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
"'the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S.
Ct. 1792, 1798 (1988); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
163. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing Zant).
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Court has merely prescribed clear, straightforward appellate review
guidelines for reviewing death sentences in weighing jurisdictions.
By doing this, the Supreme Court has not written a blank check for
state appellate courts to cash as they see fit in capital cases. Rather,
the Court has precisely specified how appellate courts in weighing
jurisdictions may now write that check.
C. Clemons Reaffirms Eighth Amendment Sentencing
Parameters
The eighth amendment is strengthened, rather than weakened,
under Clemons. Since Clemons prohibits a death sentence from
being affirmed via reweighing or harmless error analysis if the
facts do not support such a result, the ruling has upheld the
preeminence of the eighth amendment in the imposition of capital
punishment. For example, the Supreme Court's own refusal to
affirm the sentence in Clemons and the Court's decision to remand
for reconsideration suggests that the Court will continue to ensure
that each capital defendant is given individualized treatment under
the law. To illustrate, note that in Clemons, the Court was not
satisfied that the Mississippi Supreme Court had properly employed
either reweighing or harmless error theory to the facts, and thus
remanded the sentence for reconsideration under either of these two
methods. Furthermore, all nine justices, albeit in dicta, offered the
Mississippi Supreme Court some direction on remand by
expressing their skepticism over the trial court's error in Clemons
to have been truly "harmless," given the facts of record.'64
Perhaps this suggests that the Supreme Court of the United States
would not hesitate to once again grant certiorari if the Mississippi
court were to affirm Clemons' sentence on the questionable theory
of harmless error. This close judicial scrutiny of Clemons'
individual circumstances, as required by Furman and its progeny,
suggests that the seemingly broad discretionary power now
164. Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1451 (1990); id. at 1459 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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conferred upon appellate courts in weighing jurisdictions is
sufficiently channelled and limited to satisfy the eighth amendment.
IV. CALIFoRNIA's CAPITAL SENTENCING SYSTEM
Like Mississippi, California is a weighing jurisdiction, and its
capital sentencing system provides express statutory guidance to the
trier of fact for determining the appropriate sentence.'
65
Additionally, the California Supreme Court has recently interpreted
and applied the relevant statutes in a manner which, until the
Clemons decision, raised a serious constitutionality question.
66
A. Statutes
California's capital offense adjudication and sentencing statutes
are very similar to those of Mississippi. 67 As in Mississippi,
165. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1 - 190.5 (Deering 1985 and Supp. 1991) (describing
available punishments and capital trial procedures).
166. See People v. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 754 P.2d 1070, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1988) cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1019 (1989) (illustrating the California Supreme Court's usage of Zant v. Stephens
to uphold a death sentence).
167. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190 (Deering Supp. 1991) (describing punishment for
murder); 190.1 (Deering 1985) (describing procedure in cases involving death penalty); 190.2
(Deering Supp. 1991) (describing special circumstances permitting certain punishments); 190.3
(Deering 1985) (describing procedure for determination as to penalty of death or life imprisonment,
including the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances); 190.4 (Deering 1985)
(describing the need for special finding on truth of each alleged special circumstance) with Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19 (Supp. 1990) (defining murder and capital murder); 99-19-101 (Supp. 1990)
(specifying procedure for jury to determine punishment in capital cases in separate sentencing
proceeding, including the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered). The death
penalty in California has long been subjected to constitutional challenges. See generally 3 WrDUN
AND EpsTEN, CALORNIA C RmiNAL LAw §§ 1345-1381 (2d ed. 1989). Until 1972, California's
death penalty was consistently upheld by both the California Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
of the United States. Id. §§ 1345-1347. In 1972, the California Supreme Court declared that the
state's capital punishment law violated the California Constitution, and reversed the death sentence
imposed in that case. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628,656-57,493 P.2d 880,899, 100 Cal. Rptr.
152, 171 (1972). Later that year, an initiative amendment to the California Constitution, Article I,
section 27 was adopted to explicitly permit capital punishment. See CAL CONsT. art. 1, § 27 (adopted
by initiative, Nov. 7, 1972). However, the Supreme Court of the United States' vague decision
delivered in Furman v. Georgia shed uncertainty upon the constitutionality of the death penalty under
any circumstances. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing Furman). Thus, in
1973, the California Legislature, responding to the Furman decision, enacted California Statutes
chapter 719, which severely limited the trier of fact's discretionary authority in determining whether
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California conducts bifurcated trials in capital cases."' In
addition, California specifies by statute the various aggravating
circumstances which permit a death sentence to be imposed, as
opposed to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole."
One of these aggravating circumstances is the offense's "heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" nature, language identical to that of the
Mississippi statute scrutinized in Clemons.17°
to impose the death penalty. See 1973 Cal. Stat. ch 719, sec. 6 at 1298 (enacting Cal. Penal Code
§ 190.3). See also Review of Selected California Legislation, 5 PAc. LJ. 205, 321-330 (1974)
(analyzing the 1973 death penalty law). The bill was authored by then Senator George Deukmejian,
and was signed into law by then Governor Ronald Reagan. Id However, the California Supreme
Court declared this law unconstitutional in Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420,426,556 P.2d
1101, 1104, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 653 (1976). In response to this decision, the legislature enacted a
new death penalty law, also authored by Senator Deukmejian, and enacted over Governor Jerry
Brown's veto, as an urgency measure in 1977. See 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 316, sec 11 at 1257 (repealing
and enacting Cal. Penal Code § 190.3). See also WnmuN, supra § 1379; Review of Selected
California Legislation, 9 PAC. LJ. 281,439-54 (1978) (analyzing the 1977 death penalty law). This
legislative action was strengthened by a voter initiative statute in 1978, which expanded and modified
the allowable special circumstances to be considered in jury deliberations. See 1978 Cal. Stat. prop.
7, sec. 4 (repealing and enacting Cal. Penal Code § 190.3) (adopted by initiative, Nov. 7, 1978). See
also WrraN, supra § 1380 (summarizing the 1978 death penalty initiative). This statute has
withstood several constitutional challenges, and is presently in effect. See, e.g., People v. Frierson,
25 Cal. 3d 142, 172-86, 599 P.2d 587, 604-13, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281,298-07 (1979) (recognizing the
constitutionality of the statute by plurality opinion); People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 315, 618 P.2d
149, 175, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 629 (1980) (upholding the statute's constitutionality by majority
opinion); People v. Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1035,755 P.2d 1017, 1049,248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 600
(1988) (affirming the Jackson decision). George Deukmejian, the author of the statute, prosecuted
capital cases under the 1977-78 law as state attorney general from 1979-83, and served as
California's governor from 1983-91. See Deukmejian, Murder & the Death Penalty-A SpecialReport
to the People, Cal. Dept. of Justice at 3, 8-9 (1981). See also Gray & Green, Fast Start Marred by
Stumbles, Sacramento Bee, December 30,1990, at A13, col. I (summarizing Governor Deukmejian's
tenure as governor). However, as governor, Governor Deukmejian was never presented a capital case
for which to issue an execution order. Id.
168. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (Deering 1985); MISs. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (Supp
1990) (comparison of capital case sentencing procedures).
169. See CAL PENAL CODE §§ 190.2 (Deering Supp. 1991) (enumerating the special
circumstances which make a defendant eligible for either the death penalty or life imprisonment
without parole); 190.3 (Deering 1985) (describing the aggravating circumstances the jury may use
in the weighing process). Cf Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1990) (describing the permissible
aggravating factors, and the weighing process). The aggravating circumstances thejury may consider
under California Penal Code section 190.3 include the special circumstances found under section
190.2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2 (Deering Supp. 1991); 190.3 (Deering 1985).
170. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(14) (Deering Supp. 1991); See MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
101(5)(h) (Supp. 1990).
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B. California Case Law Prior to Clemons v. Mississippi
Although the California Supreme Court has never addressed
the issue of appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, it has nevertheless affimned constitutionally-tainted
death sentences on harmless error grounds."'
1. People v. Allen and Harmless Error
In People v. Allen,172 the California Supreme Court held that
a jury's consideration of eight special circumstance findings was
harmless error, because three other valid special circumstance
findings remained.173 In Allen, the defendant was convicted of
three murders, as well as conspiracy to murder several
wit1esses.74 In arguing for imposition of the death penalty, the
prosecution submitted evidence of eleven special circumstances'75
for the jury's consideration. 176 The jury found all eleven
circumstances existed, and sentenced the defendant to death.
177
On appeal, the California Supreme Court ruled that, because of
prosecutorial error, eight special circumstances were erroneous.'78
However, the sentence was affirmed on the basis of harmless
error.179 Because of the existence of three valid circumstances,
the court found no prejudicial effect from the eight invalid
circumstances. 80
171. See infra notes 172-180 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Allen).
172. 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986).
173. Id. at 1281-83, 729 P.2d at 152-53, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87.
174. Id. at 1222, 729 P.2d at 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
175. During the weighing process, special circumstances are included in the broader category
of aggravating circumstances. See supra note 169 (describing sections 190.2 and 190.3 of the
California Penal Code, which categorize special and aggravating circumstances).
176. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1273, 729 P.2d at 146, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1273-74, 729 P.2d at 146-47, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
179. Id. at 1288, 729' P.2d at 157, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
180. Id. at 1281-83, 729 P.2d at 152-53, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87.
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2. People v. Silva: Improper Application of Zant v. Stephens?
Two years after Allen, in People v. Silva,"'l the California
Supreme Court ruled that a jury's consideration of three invalid
special circumstance findings was harmless error, and that the
sentence could be upheld on the basis of a single remaining special
circumstance. 182 In Silva, the defendant had been convicted of
murder, and the jury found felony-murder, heinous murder, witness
murder, and financial gain murder special circumstances to have
existed. 3' The defendant was sentenced to death.'4 On appeal,
the California Supreme Court ruled three of the four special
circumstances invalid and the jury's consideration of them
improper."'s However, the court refused to vacate or reverse the
sentence, despite the invalid circumstances."8 6 In affirming the
sentence, the court relied heavily upon Zant v. Stephens."8 7 In
Zant, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a death
penalty where one of the several aggravating circumstances found
to be present by the jury was subsequently determined invalid,
because the remaining circumstance was sufficient to warrant the
death penalty."8 However, the Zant Court specifically restricted
the case's applicability to nonweighing jurisdictions."8 9 Since
181. 45 Cal. 3d 604,754 P.2d 1070,247 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1988) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019
(1989).
182. Id. at 632-33, 754 P.2d at 1085-86, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
183. Id. at 604, 754 P.d at 1070, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
184. Id. at 614, 754 P.2d at 1073, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
185. Id. at 632-36, 754 P.2d at 1085-87, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 588-91.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 632, 754 P.2d at 1085, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 588 (citing Zant). The court also followed
People v. Allen in ruling the erroneous consideration of those factors to have been harmless error.
Id. In doing so, the majority reasoned that the exceptional nature of the lone remaining aggravating
circumstance, and the apparent absence of any mitigating circumstances sufficient to justify the jury's
sentence. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the consideration of the invalid circumstances probably
did not affect the jury's determination. Id. But Allen is arguably distinguishable from Silva, because
two of the invalid special circumstances considered by the jury in Silva were not merely duplicative
of other valid circumstances, as in Allen, but were based upon independently considered invalid
evidence and thus were inherently improper. Id. at 645-46, 754 P.2d at 1094-95, 247 Cal. Rptr. at
597-98 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
188. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing Zant).
189. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983).
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California is a weighing jurisdiction,'" the California Supreme
Court's reliance upon Zant may be flawed, thereby possibly
rendering the Silva analysis invalid.19
Until Clemons v. Mississippi was decided, the California
Supreme Court had never reweighed remaining special
circumstances, 192 and had based at least one death sentence
affirmance upon Zant, a United States Supreme Court case which
pertained to a different type of capital sentencing jurisdiction.193
Thus, when Clemons went to the Supreme Court of the United
States, the constitutionality of California's capital sentence
appellate review techniques was uncertain.
V. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Clemons v. Mississippi extends the Zant salvage rule to
appellate courts in weighing jurisdictions, by permitting them to
reweigh remaining circumstances and thereby uphold a death
sentence even if the initial sentence had to be determined by a
jury."9 If a state appellate court elects not to reweigh the
circumstances, the appellate court may nevertheless uphold the
sentence on a harmless error theory.'95
A. Clemons v. Mississippi Validates People v. Allen and People
v. Silva
Prior to Clemons, the Supreme Court of the United States had
not ruled on the constitutionality of employing harmless error
analysis to a jury-imposed death sentence, nor had it prescribed an
190. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1985) (describing the weighing process in capital
punishment sentencing).
191. See Silva, 45 Cal. 3d at 643, 754 P.2d at 1092-93, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 596 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (criticizing the majority's reliance upon Zant because of the inapplicability
of te Zant case to weighing Jurisdictions).
192. See supra notes 171-193 and accompanying text (discussing California case law preceding
Cemons).
193. See supra notes 181-191 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Silva).
194. Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (1990).
195. Id. at 1450-52.
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appropriate appellate review technique for courts in weighing
jurisdictions. Prior to Clemons, the California Supreme Court had
employed harmless error theory in Allen, and had extended the
Zant salvage rule to California, a weighing jurisdiction, in
Silva.196 Thus, the decision two years later in Clemons confirming
the validity of both appellate reweighing and harmless error
analysis of jury-imposed death sentences appears to have eradicated
the constitutional uncertainty surrounding the procedures employed
by the California Supreme Court in Allen and Silva.
At first glance, Clemons presents an opportunity for appellate
courts to expedite capital appeals and, in turn, increase the low
execution rate which is often criticized by death penalty
advocates.197 Hence, the Clemons ruling may have enabled
California to move another step closer to its first execution in
twenty-four years.198 However, a closer look at recent trends may
suggest a contrary result.199
196. See supra notes 172-191 and accompanying text (discussing Allen and Silva).
197. See, e.g., Savage, Panel Would End Death Row Inmates' Multiple Appeals, LA. Times,
Sept. 22, 1989, at 15, col. 1 (citing selected findings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, led by former Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.). Approximately
2200 inmates are on death row in the United States. Id. However, fewer than 200 inmates have been
executed since 1976, resulting in an average delay of eight years from sentencing to execution. Id.
This extremely low execution rate has led Justice Powell to speculate that capital punishment will
eventually be abolished in the United States because of lack of enforcement. See Coyle, Trade-off
Proffered by Proposa4 The Nat'l LJ., October 2, 1989, pg 3, col I (quoting Justice Powell).
198. The most recent execution in California occurred on April 12, 1967, when Aaron Mitchell
was put to death for the murder of a Sacramento police officer. See Deukmejian, Murder & the Death
Penalty-A Special Report to the People, Cal. Dept. of Justice, at App. Ell, p. i (1981). Widespread
state attention has focused, however, on the fate of Robert Alton Harris, convicted of the 1978
murders of two San Diego youths. See Hager, Divided Court Upholds Harris' Death Penalty, L.A.
Tunes, August 30, 1990, at Al, col. 2; Gross, California Closer to its First Execution Since 1967,
N.Y. Times, August 30, 1990, at B10, col. 4. In 1990, Harris nearly made history as the first
California executee in 23 years, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay of execution
on March 30, 1990, and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to vacate that stay just 12 hours prior to
Harris' appointment with the gas chamber. See Vasquez v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1799 (1990). The Ninth
Circuit subsequently heard Harris' claim that he was denied competent psychiatric help at his trial
in 1979. See Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606 (1990). After the hearing, a divided three-judge circuit
court upheld the sentence on August 29, 1990, but as of the date of this Note's writing (January,
1991), no execution date has been re-established. Id. at 609, 630.
199. See infra notes 210,212 and accompanying text (examining trends in execution rates in
various jurisdictions).
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B. Appellate Reweighing Not Required
Clemons permits appellate courts to reweigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.2" Clemons does not, however, require
appellate courts to perform this function."0 Indeed, the majority
opinion specifically permits appellate courts to remand such causes
to the trier of fact for reconsideration.2" To this end, Justice
White openly acknowledged that the "peculiarities" of some cases
will render meaningful appellate reweighing or harmless error
analysis extremely speculative or even impossible. 3 Justice
Blackmun echoed these concerns in his dissent, questioning the
validity of appellate reweighing in all capital cases, since such a
procedure is disallowed in civil lawsuits.2"
Because of these concerns, and in light of the gravity of
erroneous capital sentencing decisions, appellate courts may refuse
to affirm death sentences based upon questionable issues of fact.
Appellate court judges, far removed from actual witnesses'
testimony, may become very reluctant to play the role of the jury
by reweighing evidence on the basis of only a written transcript. If
true, this would reduce the rate of death sentence affirmances, and
in turn, reduce the execution rate.
C. Will Harmless Error Lead to Wrongful Execution?
Appellate courts might be reluctant to apply the Supreme
Court-approved harmless error approach, for the same reason these
courts might hesitate to reweigh circumstances. To illustrate, note
that the evidence in Clemons led all nine justices to agree that a
harmless error ruling in that case would have been strained.2 °5
200. Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (1990).
201. Id. at 1451. "Nothing in this opinion is intended to convey the impression that state
appellate courts are required to or necessarily should engage in reweighing or harmless error analysis
when errors have occurred in a capital sentencing proceeding. Our holding is only that such
procedures are constitutionally permissible." Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1459 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
205. Id. at 1451; id. at 1459 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Indeed, the sheer impact of ruling almost anything in a capital case
to be "harmless" when second-guessing a jury's motives could
make an observer wonder about the judiciary's perception of the
value of human life. Therefore, assuming appellate court judges are
sensitive to the public's perceptions, they may hesitate to "rubber
stamp" death sentences containing seemingly innocuous errors.
However, the California Supreme Court's activist approach to
affirming death sentences, as illustrated in Allen and Silva, suggests
otherwise.2' The California Supreme Court's willingness to
extend harmless error analysis to jury-imposed death sentences, as
well as its usage of the Zant nonweighing jurisdiction salvage rule
in a weighing jurisdiction, prior to express Supreme Court of the
United States approval, may lead one to believe that the California
Supreme Court will interpret appellate review authority as defined
in Clemons very broadly.207
D. Juror Awareness May Affect Sentencing
Although Clemons provides appellate courts the power to
expedite capital appeals, and assuming, arguendo, that the courts
will be willing to use this power, the realization of this prospect
may ultimately have an anomalous effect upon the capital
sentencing system. This is due to the effect individual jurors'
consciences may have upon the capital sentencing mechanism. To
illustrate, one should examine an issue other than the harmless
error issue which arose in Silva. The issue involves the jury's
perceptions of the judiciary's power of reversal. After receiving
jury instructions and beginning penalty deliberations, the Silva jury
questioned the trial court about the extent of the court's authority
to override a verdict of death.20 ' The trial court refused to answer
this question, nor did the court modify the jury instructions in light
206. See supra notes 172-180 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Allen); supra notes
181-191 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Silva).
207. See People v. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604,754 P.2d 1070,247 Cal. Rptr 573 (1988) (affirming
a death sentence despite an invalid aggravating circumstance); People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222,729
P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986) (afflrming a death sentence on harmless error theory).
208. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d at 640-41, 754 P.2d at 1091, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
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of this inquiry, and these decisions were upheld by the California
Supreme Court on appeal. 9
The jury's inquisitive act in Silva raises concerns about jurors'
subconscious, or perhaps conscious thoughts encountered during
deliberations. The logical question to ask in light of Silva is: "Why
would a jury want to know about the trial court's inherent power
to overturn a death sentence?" The answer might be: "If
individuals know that an erroneous death sentence can be
overturned, they will be more likely to gamble and decide in favor
of death over life imprisonment." Conversely, if a jury thinks that
an erroneous death sentence can be summarily approved at the
appellate level merely on a reweighing or harmless error theory, the
jury may hesitate to choose in favor of the ultimate punishment.
The recent decline in death sentences rendered in several
jurisdictions supports this theory."' Perhaps this suggests that,
209. Id.
210. See Sullivan, New Jersey's Death Penalty: Fair or Fake?, N.Y. Times, September 13,
1990 at BI, col. 5 (recounting the recent decline in New Jersey's execution rate, despite strong
judicial support in applying the law). New Jersey officials have stated that juries are becoming more
reluctant to impose the death penalty. Id. Said one prosecutor.
If you ask people in the street if they support the death penalty, most would say they
did. But it becomes a different matter when they sit in a jury box and look at the person
on trial and hear things about them, both good and bad, that bring home the fact that
the life of a human being is in their hands.
Id. See also Feldman, Livesay, Deathsay; Assistant D.A. Serves as the FinalArbiter in Capital Cases,
LA. Times, May 5, 1988, § 2 at 1, col. I (citing the fact that two out of every three Los Angeles
juries reject the death penalty). "When push comes to shove with a jury, they are very reluctant to
impose the death penalty," said Ira Reiner, Los Angeles District Attorney. Id. Also, the defendant's
age can influence jurors and judges alike. See Vanore, The Decency of Capital Punishment for
Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. LJ. 757, 790 (1986). Jurors
are often reluctant to impose capital punishment on minors, and appellate courts sometimes use the
defendant's youth as the basis for overturning death sentences. Id. Further, many jurors are reluctant
to impose capital punishment on teenagers because they often have children of their own, and can
empathize with the defendants' parents. Fein, Juveniles Get a Big Reminder, The Washington Times,
July 11, 1989, at FI (commentary). Studies have also indicated juror reluctance over imposing the
death penalty when the method of execution seems cruel. See Bayer, No Nice Face for Death, N.Y.
Times, July 15, 1983, at A23, col. 5. For this reason, some jurisdictions now use or are contemplating
using lethal injection, instead of hanging, the firing squad, electrocution, and even the gas chamber,
as the preferred method of execution. Id. See also Hohler, Not Carried Out For Fifty Years, Boston
Globe, July 9, 1989, New Hampshire Weekly Section, at I (summarizing state attorney general's
view that New Hampshire's execution rate will increase now that lethal injection has replaced
hanging).
970
1991 / Clemons v. Mississippi
although the public generally supports the concept of capital
punishment,2" few individuals want to be the ones who get blood
on their hands.21 2
Thus, while Clemons might expedite the capital punishment
appellate review process, the net result might be that appellate
courts will have fewer death sentences to review in the future,
possibly resulting in little or no change in the execution rate.
CONCLUSION
Prior to Clemons, there existed no clear rule for appellate
courts in weighing jurisdictions to employ in upholding
constitutionally infirm death sentences. Now, in weighing
jurisdictions, when a jury-imposed death sentence is based, in part,
upon an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance, a state appellate
court may affirm the sentence in either of two ways: (1) By
reweighing the remaining circumstances and determining that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances;
or (2) by determining that the jury's consideration of the
unconstitutional aggravating circumstance was harmless error.
This seemingly broad allotment of appellate review authority
may at first lead one to believe that Clemons will expedite the
capital appeal process and in turn lead to a higher execution rate.
However, even if appellate courts decide to exercise this power and
211. See Mouat, Death Penalty Gains Favor in U.S., Christian Science Monitor, July 26, 1990,
at 6 (asserting support for capital punishment in the United States to be at an all-time high of 70 to
80 percent).
212. See Bloom, Salcido Must Die, Jury Says, Sacramento Bee, November 17, 1990, at Al
(recounting jurors' sentiments after delivering their verdict in a recent California capital case).
Although the jury imposed the death sentence, several jurors expressed sympathy for the defendant.
Id. One juror summed it up by saying, "Sentencing someone to death is something none of us
wanted to do. It will take a very long time to get over this for all of us." Id. In assessing the
possibility of a lighter sentence being imposed had the defendant testified on his own behalf, the juror
stated, "We were looking for anything that would have shown us he was sorry for his actions." Id.
Perhaps the trial judge in People v. Silva described jurors' self-imposed restraint best when, after
refusing to answer thejury's questions about the possibility ofoverturning a death sentence, the judge
stated, "I think [the possibility of death sentence reversal] suggests an easy way out to the jury and
allows them to think in terms of the Pontius Pilate theory, 'I wash my hands of it.' People v. Silva,
45 Cal. 3d 604, 641, 754 P.2d 1070, 1091, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 594.
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expedite capital appeals, these courts may, in the long term, have
fewer death sentences to expedite because of jurors' reluctance to
impose death sentences when execution seems likely.
Therefore, Clemons' long-term effect on the nation's execution
rate will depend primarily upon two factors: (1) appellate courts'
willingness to employ this newly-approved discretion; and (2) the
extent to which jurors will impose softer sentences in response to
that willingness. The result could be an ironic power struggle
which only further delays the imposition of justice by a method a
majority of Americans claim to support.
Fred P. Cavese
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